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Abstract 
We analyse whether public subsidies supporting collaborative research and development (R&D) 
projects in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are able to encourage persistent R&D 
investment and interorganisational networking more than subsidies supporting individual R&D 
projects. Adopting a counterfactual approach to policy evaluation, we compare subsidies for 
collaborative R&D and for individual R&D implemented in the same Italian region in the same 
period. Our findings suggest that, once public support is no longer available, the two subsidies have 
different effects on different types of SMEs. If the policymakers’ objective is to increase the 
number of R&D-performing SMEs over time, they should provide subsidies for collaborative R&D 
to firms with modest R&D experience. If their objective is to increase the amount of spontaneous 
R&D investment over time, they should target SMEs with some prior R&D experience, using either 
subsidy. Finally, if their  objective is to induce SMEs to network with external organisations, 
subsidies for collaborative R&D projects should be preferred to subsidies for individual R&D 
projects. 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation policies often target small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), many of which lack 
adequate financial or human resources to undertake research and development (R&D) activities 
(Vossen, 1998; Peneder, 2008; Ortega-Argilés et al., 2009). In countries with multi-level policy 
frameworks, such policies are more likely to be implemented at the regional level (Blanes and 
Busom, 2004), where interventions often pursue local development objectives. As a consequence, 
many regional innovation policies aim not only to support the R&D efforts of the most dynamic 
SMEs, but also to expand the range of SMEs that perform some amount of R&D. This dual 
objective is typical of lagging economies as well as of more advanced ones: even in the latter, in 
fact, many SMEs do not innovate at all and, among those that do, many engage in forms of 
innovation that are not necessarily based on R&D (Som 2012). 
Policymakers can pursue the dual objective to support dynamic SMEs’ R&D efforts and encourage 
more SMEs to take up R&D activities through different policy instruments, including subsidies, 
tax-credits, loans or consultancies. We focus on subsidies and, in particular, on two distinct 
approaches to delivering them. On the one hand, policymakers can provide SMEs with subsidies for 
individual R&D projects, in order to overcome the financial hurdles that prevent them from 
engaging in R&D activities or limit the amount of their R&D investment. Until recently, this is by 
far the most common approach. On the other hand, policymakers can grant subsidies to SMEs that 
perform collaborative R&D projects with external organisations (such as universities, public bodies, 
other firms or others), a more complex form of support that mixes financial and behavioural 
incentives. Besides providing financial support, these policies stimulate SMEs to internalise 
spillovers, pool resources and share costs (Hagedoorn et al., 2000). By encouraging collaboration, 
policymakers aim to address network failures that can occur whenever firms’ lack of linkages with 
other organisations leads to an insufficient development of complementarities, learning processes, 
and creation of new ideas, or when firms are trapped in relational and knowledge lock-ins (Carlsson 
and Jacobsson, 1997; Nooteboom, 2000; Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Hekkert and Negro, 2009). This 
can be particularly important for SMEs, which are often constrained by limited internal resources 
(Nooteboom, 1994).  
R&D collaboration policies have gained popularity in recent years (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1997; 
Rahm et al., 2000). However, despite their growing international diffusion, there is still little 
empirical evidence regarding their ability to support R&D and networking both in absolute terms 
and compared with other more established approaches, such as subsidies to individual R&D.  
Several recent studies comparing the effects of different R&D policies have either contrasted 
policies implemented at different government levels (Marzucchi and Montresor, 2013; Huergo and 
Moreno, 2017), or compared R&D subsidies and R&D tax-credits (Hægeland and Møen, 2007; 
Busom et al., 2014; Garza et al., 2015). To the best of our knowledge, a comparative evaluation of 
subsidies for individual and collaborative R&D projects has not yet been performed. 
Focusing on SME innovation policy, our contribution aims to address this gap and to stimulate 
further debate on the topic. In particular, we analyse whether subsidies for SMEs to perform 
collaborative R&D projects are more or less able than subsidies for SMEs’ individual R&D projects 
to stimulate R&D and networking effects after the subsidised project is completed. The term ‘R&D 
effects’ refers to the increase in R&D investment induced by the receipt of public aid (David and 
Hall, 2000). From a social viewpoint, this can be achieved both through an increase in R&D 
investment by all firms, including those that were already R&D performers, and through an increase 
in the number of R&D performers (Gonzales et al, 2005; Arqué-Castells and Mohnen, 2015; Garza 
et al., 2015). In what follows we will consider both aspects. The network effects – which is part of 
the broader notion of behavioural additionality (Buisseret et al., 1995; Autio et al., 2008) – refers to 
the increase in collaborations with external organisations induced by the receipt of public aid 
(Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006; Falk, 2007; Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008).  
A striking result emerging from the previous literature is that individual R&D subsidies can support 
networking (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Antonioli et al., 2014). Therefore, one might 
wonder whether subsidies for collaborative R&D are really needed to boost firms’ networking 
propensity, or whether individual R&D subsidies may be sufficient for this purpose. Our study can 
potentially contribute to improving policy design besides advancing general knowledge of 
comparative policy effects.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we put forward an interpretative framework to guide 
us in the analysis of the comparative effects of the two policies. Section 3 describes in some detail 
the empirical object of the analysis: two different policy interventions – one being a subsidy for 
collaborative R&D projects and the other a subsidy for individual R&D projects. Both interventions 
were implemented in the same region (Tuscany, Italy), in the same programming period (2000-
2006), by the same public authority (the regional government), and targeted the same types of 
beneficiaries (SMEs). Section 4 presents data and variables, and Section 5 explains our empirical 
strategy, which uses a matching approach applied to the case of multiple treatments, as proposed by 
Lechner (2002a, 2002b). So far, this approach has not been adopted in relation to enterprise and 
innovation policies. Sections 6 and 7 present and discuss the results. Finally, Section 8 concludes 
with policy implications and proposed avenues for further research. 
 
 
2. Interpretative framework and resulting hypotheses 
 
It has been argued that R&D subsidies can increase aggregate R&D in two (non mutually exclusive) 
ways: they can increase the number of firms performing R&D (extensive margin) or the R&D 
investment made by any firm (intensive margin) (Gonzalez et al, 2005; Arqué-Castells and 
Mohnen, 2015; Garza et al., 2015). Arqué-Castells and Mohnen (2015) suggest that R&D subsidies 
can stimulate the increase in R&D over one or the other margin depending on their size. Subsidies 
that are large enough to cover the cost of initiating R&D activities (i.e. the entry threshold, which is 
rather high due to the presence of sunk costs) can affect the extensive margin, while subsidies above 
the continuation threshold – which is lower than the entry threshold – can affect the intensive 
margin.  
Other contributions suggest that different types of policy instruments have different effects on R&D 
increases over the intensive or the extensive margin. Comparisons between R&D tax-credits and 
individual subsidies (Busom et al., 2014; Garza et al., 2015) find that, because of their greater 
simplicity and flexibility, tax-credits are better able to increase R&D investment on the part of 
R&D-performing firms that do not suffer from serious financing constraints and, therefore, would 
not need to receive the aid in advance. Instead, subsidies are more attractive for financially-
constrained firms such as SMEs and suited to encourage both R&D entry and higher R&D 
investment. 
What type of subsidy - to individual or collaborative R&D projects – works better remains an open 
question, especially if we are interested in assessing the effectiveness of such subsidies with respect 
to their legacy effects (Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). In our study, we investigate the effects of 
the programmes on firms’ later R&D behaviour, in a time where public aid is no longer available. 
At this time, the main effect that can be investigated is R&D persistence: the extent to which firms 
that received the subsidy continue to perform R&D. In this context, the definition of extensive and 
intensive margin put forward by the previous literature needs to be adjusted: one might view 
persistence effects as a matter of higher probability of performing R&D (extensive margin), or as a 
matter of higher R&D investment (intensive margin) during the unsubsidised follow-up period. As 
we will explain in what follows, this distinction is relevant because we argue that the two policies 
we focus on can have different effects on the different margins. 
There are a number of reasons for focusing on R&D persistence, particularly when analysing SMEs. 
It is known that SMEs tend to carry out, if any, informal R&D activities (Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 
1991), often in an intermittent and semi-structured way (Rammer et al., 2009). This approach limits 
the accumulation of internal R&D skills over time, increasing SMEs’ dependence on the inflows of 
external knowledge and know-how, which are subject to search, screening and other transaction 
costs (Fontana et al., 2006), and may ultimately result in discontinuous R&D practice (Rammer et 
al., 2009). The presence of persistence effects suggests that a policy has been able to encourage 
SMEs to engage in R&D more continuously, independently from future subsidisation programmes. 
As argued by Klette and Møen (2012), positive effects may be expected to arise after a time lag has 
passed due to the fact that the implementation of the subsidised project can induce learning-by-
doing in R&D activities, and thus change the firms’ future profit opportunities in favour of more 
R&D-intensive products.  
 
2.1. Effects on R&D 
Both in the case of policies supporting collaborative R&D projects and of those supporting 
individual R&D projects, the subsidy may help SMEs carry out R&D activities and learn from the 
project. Thanks to experiential learning processes, employees and managers can develop new or 
improved skills and increase their capacity to interpret different aspects of the creative process, 
which can drive change in company routines (Cyert and March, 1963; Clarysse et al, 2009). 
Moreover, during the project’s development, the firm can build or acquire some innovation 
infrastructures or equipment, which can be used in future innovation projects. Once the subsidised 
project is over, new and improved knowledge, skills, capabilities, routines, and, possibly, 
equipment and infrastructures, improve the value of the firm’s future innovation projects and 
therefore can increase the probability that it will continue to invest in R&D with its own funds 
(Clarysse et al., 2009; Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). The increase in absorptive capacity that 
results from new and improved skills can strengthen this effect (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). As 
investing in R&D has become less costly, the SME can even decide to increase the amount 
invested. However, the effect on the amount invested is more uncertain because, for example, there 
could be an “optimal” project dimension that the SME, even for organizational or cognitive reasons, 
can manage (Bocci and Mariani, 2015).  
R&D collaboration subsidies combine financial and behavioural incentives, since they are designed 
to trigger interorganisational learning.1An important prerequisite for triggering interorganisational 
learning processes is that the firm has internal skills, capabilities, routines and governance systems 
                                                
 
1Obviously, nothing prevents a firm that receives a subsidy for individual R&D from using the subsidy to purchase 
external knowledge, if the firm is aware of such need. However, this type of policy requires that most of the activity is 
carried out within the boundaries of the firm. 
that allow or facilitate collaborative work with external organisations (Dyer and Singh, 1998), 
which is not always the case in SMEs (Nooteboom, 1994; Van Gils and Zwart, 2004; Teirlinck and 
Spithoven, 2013). These knowledge and skills are difficult to learn, because their partly uncodified 
nature can hamper their diffusion to third parties (Polanyi, 1966; Howells, 1996; Kale et al., 2000). 
The collaborative work that develops during the subsidised project can instead facilitate such 
diffusion, as far as it facilitates the development of interorganisational trust (Dogdson, 1992, 1993). 
Public funding can support either the experimentation with brand-new collaborative practices or the 
fine-tuning of existing ones, which can be used in future activities. After the end of the subsidised 
project, the firm will find it more useful and less costly to collaborate with external organisations. 
This is particularly important in environments where collaboration is crucial for competitiveness 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Chesbrough et al., 2006), and particularly for SMEs, which can rely on 
relatively scarce internal resources and competencies (Narula, 2004; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Lee 
et al., 2010). An SME that has learned how to collaborate with external partners knows how to 
access and manage the different pieces of knowledge and skills that are needed to carry out an R&D 
project (van de Vrande et al., 2009) and therefore will be more likely to continue to perform R&D 
activities. 
This effect can be strengthened by the fact that the collaborative work that takes place during the 
funded project can facilitate the sharing of other knowledge and skills that would otherwise be 
difficult to transmit and absorb such as, for example, partners’ strategies or expectations (e.g. with 
respect to the development of a certain sector or a certain technology), or information about the 
capabilities and reliability of customers, suppliers or other organizations that play an important role 
in a certain sector  or technology (Powell, 1996). Although this knowledge and information are not 
of primary importance for R&D, they can facilitate the development of such activities in SMEs, 
which have a relatively small human capital pool, few managers and little resources to be invested 
in searching and screening of the external context (Vossen, 1998). 
Therefore, we put forward the following hypothesis concerning persistent R&D effects along the 
extensive margin:  
 
H1: The probability to continue to invest in R&D is higher for firms receiving subsidies for a 
collaborative R&D project than for firms receiving subsidies for an individual R&D project 
 
If - as we believe - there is higher probability of R&D persistence due to the subsidy, we may 
conclude that, from an aggregate perspective, the programme has succeeded in extending the pool 
of SMEs that perform R&D without public subsidy (extensive margin). Given that identifying and 
finding external partners and managing R&D activities may have become less costly, SMEs may 
decide to invest increasing amounts in R&D. However, as stated above, this effect is rather 
uncertain as SMEs could continue to manage R&D projects of relatively small size (Bocci and 
Mariani, 2015). Therefore, we do not state a hypothesis concerning persistent R&D effects along 
the intensive margin. 
 
2.2. Effects on networking 
Based on the previous arguments, SMEs that have participated in the policy supporting 
collaborative R&D should be more likely to continue to collaborate in the future with external 
organizations than SMEs that have participated in the policy subsidising individual R&D projects. 
For this reason, we put forward the following hypothesis concerning persistent network effects: 
 
H2: Ex-post networking effects are higher for firms receiving subsidies for a collaborative R&D 
project than for firms receiving an individual R&D subsidy 
 
In particular, networking effects may differ according to different types of partners. SMEs are 
known to find it particularly difficult to initiate interactions with universities and public research 
organisations (Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003; Arundel and Geuna, 2004; Laursen and Salter, 2004), 
due to their large cognitive and organisational distance. SMEs and public research organisations in 
fact are characterised by different cultures and languages (Bruneel et al.,  2010; Lockett and Wright, 
2005; Sauermann and Stephan, 2013; Russo and Rossi, 2009), approaches to innovation (Barnes et 
al., 2002), and research orientation (Petruzzelli and Rotolo, 2015). Moreover, SMEs often possess 
few spare resources in order to attempt to overcome these obstacles. Therefore, collaborative R&D 
subsidies may be particularly helpful in order to encourage SMEs to interact with universities, 
rather than with other types of firms with whom SMEs might interact more easily even in the 
absence of subsidies. 
Once again, we refer to the probability of adopting a certain behaviour (in this case, a networking 
behaviour) and not to a purely additional effect. Indeed, the latter would require SMEs to increase 
the number of external organisations they collaborate with, while we do not posit that SMEs will 
always expand their network. At the same time, SMEs will not necessarily continue to collaborate 
with the same organizations they previously collaborated with (Caloffi et al., 2017). The fact of 
having experienced collaborative work and having adapted their internal routines to collaboration 
makes collaboration easier for the SMEs that participated in R&D collaboration policies than those 
who participated in the other policy under analysis.  
To test the hypotheses H1 and H2 it would be insufficient to estimate the effects of the two policies 
with respect to a counterfactual, no-policy situation and compare them. To estimate the differential 
effect of one policy versus the other, we need to account for the fact that firms that decide to 
participate in one type of policy programme are not necessarily the same that decide to participate 
in the other type of programme. Our empirical strategy will be described in section 5. 
 
3. Tuscany’s regional policy in support of R&D 
Our empirical analysis focuses on two distinct R&D policy interventions targeting SMEs that were 
implemented in an Italian region (Tuscany) in the programming period 2000-2006 (2002-2008 is 
the actual period of implementation) using European Regional Development Funds. Since the 
constitutional reform of 2001, Italian regions were conferred a number of competencies related to 
enterprise and innovation policy, based on the idea that peripheral governments should respond to 
local needs better than the central government (Caloffi and Mariani, 2018).  
Similarly to several other Italian regions, Tuscany is characterised by a relatively low aggregate 
level of private R&D investment and a very high share of SMEs, mostly belonging to low and 
medium-tech sectors (Hollanders and Es-Sadki, 2017). However, unlike other Italian regions, 
Tuscany has adopted a dual approach to SME innovation policy from the outset. It implemented 
both classical subsidies to individual R&D projects, as well as subsidies for collaborative R&D 
projects, the latter inspired by the Regional Innovation System framework which has gained 
popularity since the late 1990s (Cooke et al., 1997; Russo and Rossi, 2009). Both policies were 
designed and implemented by the same policymaker, in the same time frame and with the same 
funds, and aimed to support relatively small R&D projects carried out by SMEs. The similarity 
between the ultimate objectives of the two programmes was apparent from the official 
programming documents and calls for applications, and was confirmed by the policymakers we 
interviewed.2 Both programmes resorted to the same instrument: an R&D subsidy delivered under 
the de minimis clause.3 However, one policy provided subsidies for individual firms to perform 
                                                
 
2  The first interviews to policymakers were made in 2001 and other meetings followed during and after the 
implementation of the two programmes, also to acquire data on the participating firms. Over time, we have interviewed 
face-to-face the whole staff that managed the programmes (5 public officers and their director), asking them 
information about the objectives that the regional government wanted to pursue with these programmes, their 
implementation process as well as on the broader policy framework in which these programmes were inserted. 
3 The “de minimis” rule, first set by the European Commission in 1992, is designed to benefit small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs). At the time of the policies investigated in this paper, the rule provided that subsidies of less than € 
100,000 granted to a firm over a period of 3 years did not constitute “State Aid” within the meaning of the EC Treaty’s 
their own R&D projects, while the other subsidised projects carried out by temporary consortia or 
associations between SMEs and other organisations, such as universities, research centres, or 
innovation intermediaries (Howells, 2006, Russo and Rossi 2009). The latter intervention was 
premised on the assumption that the inclusion of these supposedly more knowledgeable 
organisations would mainly benefit participating SMEs. Therefore, it makes sense to evaluate the 
impact of the policy on SMEs, rather than on the other participants. Almost all the participants in 
the R&D collaboration policy were regional organisations. Extra-regional organisations could join 
the projects, but without receiving any subsidy. 
In both policies under analysis, public funding took the form of a non-repayable subsidy, which was 
granted conditional on the positive evaluation, by a committee of field experts, of the innovative 
projects presented by firms in response to public tenders. The final admission decision was based 
solely on project quality. The quality requirements set by the regional government were related to 
the degree of novelty of the project, the technical ability of the firm (or the consortium) to carry it 
out, the market potential and the potential spillovers of the project. 
Both policies had very broad sector and technology targets, which ranged from the traditional 
“made in Italy” (e.g.: textiles, jewellery) to high-tech manufacturing, and included also selected 
types of services.  
As both policies admitted multiple participations (either over time – i.e. to different calls for 
funding opened over the years – or, for the collaborative R&D subsidies, in multiple concurrent 
partnerships), we restrict our analysis to SMEs receiving a subsidy only once. As the effects of 
multiple subsidies could be additive, this choice is motivated by the wish to keep things as clear as 
possible. The implication of this choice is that inference will be valid for firms – the overwhelming 
majority in both programmes – receiving only one subsidy. We also excluded from the analysis 
those firms that received the subsidy from 2006 onwards, as the investment outcomes of such firms 
might have been later affected by the economic crisis. Hence, we start from a set of 292 SMEs that 
received only one subsidy for a collaborative R&D project, and from a set of 120 firms that 
received only one subsidy for an individual R&D project.    
 
4. Data and outcome variables 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
ban on aid liable to distort competition (Article 87). The cumulation of such small subsidies was possible up to the 
ceiling of  € 200,000. 
The data for our study refer not only to the two sets of firms that participated in the two policy 
programmes under investigation, but also to a third, and wider, set of firms that did not participate 
in either of the two programmes. The inclusion in the analysis of this latter set of firms will be 
motivated in Section 5.   
For each of these three sets of firms, we collected the relevant data using administrative sources and 
surveys. Time-varying data refer to two different time points. In particular, information on the 
firms’ background characteristics refers to one year before the start of the subsidised project, 
whereas information on the outcomes of interest refers to 2 years after the completion of the 
subsidised project. As the duration of projects under both programmes was about 1 year, the time 
distance between treatment and outcome was approximately 3 years. 
Based on the discussion presented in Section 3 and on the hypotheses therein, in order to measure 
the effects of the policies we chose to focus on the following five outcome variables, all measured 
after the completion of the subsidised project: (1) a binary variable called R&D equal to one if the 
firm performs internal R&D, and zero otherwise; (2) a continuous variable with the amount of the 
firm’s R&D investment4; (3) a binary variable called Collaborations equal to one if the firm was 
involved in R&D collaboration with external organisations (either universities or other firms), and 
zero otherwise; a couple of variables detailing the type of partners in R&D collaboration, and, in 
particular (4) a binary variable called Universities equal to one if the firm was involved in R&D 
collaboration with universities or other research organisations, and zero otherwise; (5) a binary 
variable called Other Firms equal to one if the firm was involved in R&D collaboration with other 
firms, and zero otherwise. 
The outcome variables of interest had to be collected through an ad hoc survey since they are 
mostly unavailable in balance-sheet data.5 The survey also offered the opportunity to collect 
information on the outcome variables prior to the programme. Information on time-invariant 
characteristics, such as legal form, sector and province, as well as on the number of employees prior 
to the programme, was drawn from the Statistical Archive of Active Enterprises (ASIA), 
maintained by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
Whereas the list of subsidised firms was provided by the regional government implementing the 
two programmes, completely untreated firms belonging to eligible sectors were hundreds of 
thousands in the region, far too many to be all surveyed. In order to identify a manageable set of 
untreated firms that could be used as controls, we adopted a matched sampling approach 
                                                
 
4The values of R&D investment are expressed at constant prices, base year is 2001. To this end we employed the R&D 
investment deflator provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics. 
5 The value of R&D investment collected through the interview was later cross-checked in balance sheets.  
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). This strategy is based on the estimation of a preliminary propensity 
score, one for each programme, from a number of basic background characteristics available on the 
full population of eligible regional enterprises, such as those available in the ASIA archive 
mentioned earlier (number of employees, legal form, sector and province). Based on these 
preliminary propensity scores, we selected a pool of untreated firms by matching each beneficiary 
to its five nearest neighbours, without replacement. 
We then launched the telephone survey to all beneficiary firms and to their matched potential 
controls. The questionnaire was submitted in 2010 to the 120 firms that received only one subsidy 
for individual R&D projects and to their potential controls, and in 2014 to the 292 firms that 
received only one subsidy for collaborative R&D projects prior to 2006 and to their potential 
controls. The interviews were with the entrepreneur or a manager who had been involved in the 
subsidised R&D projects (for treated firms) or who was responsible for R&D activities. Only 189 
beneficiary SMEs responded: all 120 firms that received the subsidy to individual R&D, and 69 
firms that received the subsidy to collaborative R&D.6 However, the subset of respondents is rather 
similar, in a range of basic background characteristics, to the two full populations of beneficiary 
firms, which suggests that the response rate is uncorrelated with such observables and that there 
could be more individual reasons for non-response (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010).7 
All background variables (henceforth also covariates) are listed in Table 1, along with their means 
in the two sets of firms that received the collaborative or the individual R&D subsidy, and in the 
two sets of related (untreated) controls. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
From Table 1, we see that firms under the two programmes had partially different background 
characteristics before they received the subsidies. In fact, firms that went on to receive the subsidy 
to collaborative R&D projects were already more likely to have relationships with external 
                                                
 
6All contacted firms received a written invitation to respond by the regional government. In the survey aimed at SMEs 
that received the subsidy for individual R&D projects and their potential controls, we could also rely on the crucial 
support of local business associations. Unfortunately, the support of business associations was not available when we 
later surveyed SMEs that received the subsidy for collaborative R&D projects, which explains the much lower response 
rate achieved with these firms. 
7 Descriptive statistics on the main background characteristics of responding and non-responding firms are available 
upon request to the authors.  
partners.8 On the other hand, firms that went on to receive the subsidy to individual R&D projects 
had already a higher propensity to engage in internal R&D.9 
 
 
5. Empirical strategy 
We view our estimation problem in the light of the potential-outcomes framework (Imbens and 
Rubin, 2015). For each firm there are three potential outcomes for each outcome variable Y: the 
value of Y if the firm receives a subsidy for a collaborative R&D project, Yi(c); the value of Y if the 
firm receives a subsidy for an individual R&D project, Yi(s); and the value of Y if the firm does not 
receive a subsidy at all, Yi(u). For each firm i, the effect of the subsidy for a collaborative project 
relative to a no-subsidy situation can be defined as the difference between the firm’s two potential 
outcomes, Yi(c)-Yi(u), whereas  the effect of the subsidy for a collaborative project relative to a 
subsidy for an individual project can be  defined as the difference between the firm’s two potential 
outcomes, Yi(c)-Yi(s), and so forth for each pair of the possible treatment levels Ti=(c,s,u). 
Unfortunately, only the potential outcome associated with the treatment actually received is 
observable, whereas the two counterfactual potential outcomes are not. Therefore, attention shifts to 
estimable average quantities and to the contrast between these quantities. Outside of experiments, 
the comparison between the average Y relative to groups of units receiving different treatments 
returns causal effects provided that some untestable assumptions are made. Given the data at hand, 
we choose to invoke the assumption of strong ignorability, which was extended to the multiple-
treatment case by Lechner (2002a; 2002b) and consists of two components: 
(i) Unconfoundedness:  Yi(u),Yi(c),Yi(s)⊥Ti|Xi , where Xi  is a vector of pre-treatment covariates 
observed for each firm i,  i.e. treatment assignment is independent of the potential outcomes 
conditional on the observed pre-treatment covariates; 
(ii) Overlap: 0<Pr( Ti=t| Xi=x)<1 , i.e. the treatment status is not a deterministic function of the 
covariates and, therefore, there is room for ceteris paribus comparisons. 
The plausibility of unconfoundedness heavily relies on the quality and on the amount of the 
information contained in the vector X. It is particularly important that such information includes the 
                                                
 
8 Firms that, prior to policy participation, collaborated with universities and other firms are 22% of those receiving 
subsidies to collaborative R&D, and 9% of those receiving subsidies to individual R&D. 
9 These pre-treatment differences between firms participating in the two programmes are confirmed by tests on the 
equality of proportions, where the null hypothesis of equality is always rejected. On the other hand, the p-value 
associated to the test on the equality of means of the pre-treatment amount of R&D investment does not allow to reject 
the null hypothesis of equality. The detailed results of the previous tests are available upon request to the authors. 
pre-treatment values of the outcome variables of interest, as these are likely to be good predictors of 
the outcomes themselves (Heckman et al., 1997).  
For each generic pair of treatments l and m, the main causal estimand of interest is the average 
treatment effect of l for the subpopulation of firms receiving l rather than m, known as average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Under the assumption of strong ignorability, such ATT can 
be written as follows:  
         ATTl,m=E[Yi(l)-Yi(m)|T=l,Xi=x].  [1] 
 
In our context of application, the way the causal estimands presented above may be interpreted 
depends on what types of treatments l and m are (Table 2). If, for example, l=c and m=u, then [1] is 
the effect of the subsidy for a collaborative project relative to no subsidy for firms that participate in 
the collaborative programme. If l=s and m=u, [1] is the effect of the subsidy to an individual project 
relative to no subsidy for firms that participate in the programme for individual R&D projects. If, 
instead, l=c and m=s, [1] is the effect of the subsidy to a collaborative project relative to the 
subsidy to an individual project for firms that actually take the former. Finally, if l=s and m=c, [1] 
is the effect of the subsidy to an individual project relative to the subsidy to collaborative projects 
for firms that actually take the former. 
Under the assumption of strong ignorability and in the presence of multiple treatments, the previous 
causal effects can be semi-parametrically estimated by means of propensity-score matching 
(Lechner 2002a, 2002b). The propensity score is a univariate summary of the information contained 
in the vector of pre-treatment covariates. For each pair of treatments l and m, the propensity score is 
defined as 𝑒!!,!=Pr(Ti=l|Xi, T=l,m). This summary has two important properties (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983): (i) it is a balancing score, in the sense that it theoretically guarantees that 
observations with the same value of the propensity score have the same distribution of observable 
characteristics independently of the treatment; (ii) if treatment assignment is strongly ignorable 
given Xi, then it is also strongly ignorable given the propensity score. The two properties together 
make it possible to match firms from different treatment groups using this univariate summary 
instead of the original covariates. In order to facilitate the estimation of a propensity score that 
satisfies the previous property (i), Imai and Ratkovic (2014) have recently proposed a generalised-
method-of-moments estimator of the propensity score where a single model determines both the 
conditional probability of treatment assignment and optimised covariate balancing weights. A key 
advantage of this methodology is that it mitigates the harm deriving from a potential 
misspecification of a parametric propensity score, because the coefficients of the propensity score 
model are estimated maximising the covariate balance. Therefore, we resort to this powerful 
covariate-balancing propensity score (CBPS) estimator in our study. The covariates we insert in the 
CBPS models, one for each pair of treatment groups, are all the background characteristics defined 
in Table 1. They include the pre-treatment values of all outcome variables (including the deflated 
value of R&D investment), a categorical variable for the sector of the firm, a categorical variable 
for firm size, a dummy for the firm’s legal form and a categorical variable for the province in which 
the firm is located. The coefficients of the propensity score models are reported in Table A in the 
Appendix. After having ascertained that the estimated CBPSs always guarantee that the overlap 
assumption is satisfied in practice, we evaluate to which extent they also imply a satisfactory 
covariate balance. Following Imbens and Rubin (2015) and the previous methodological field 
literature, we perform this assessment by looking at normalised mean differences before and after 
conditioning on the estimated propensity scores (Table B in the Appendix). Such conditioning may 
take place by using propensity-score-based balancing weights (Imai and Ratkovic, 2014). With 
respect to the unconditional contrast between the mean level of pre-treatment covariates in each pair 
of treatment groups, once we condition on the estimated CBPSs we have considerable 
improvements in covariate balance. This notwithstanding, small differences persist in some of the 
pre-treatment values of outcome variables. We choose to address these residual differences in the 
pre-treatment values of all outcomes using the bias-corrected matching estimator by Abadie and 
Imbens (2011) that combines nearest-neighbour matching (based, in our case, on the propensity 
score as distance metric) with a correction factor calculated using a regression model for the 
outcome variable in the group of matched controls.10,11 
We match each treated firm only to its nearest-neighbour, allowing for the replacement of controls.  
Variability estimation occurs using the analytic asymptotic variance estimator by Abadie and 
Imbens (2006), which focuses on cases, like ours, where matching occurs with replacement and 
with a fixed number of matches. 
To tackle the problem of non-response of some firms that took the subsidy to collaborative R&D 
projects, we adopted an inverse probability weighting strategy (Wooldridge, 2007; Rotnitzky, 
2009).12 Under the assumption that there are no unmeasured confounders for both treatment and 
                                                
 
10 After conditioning on the propensity score ecs = Pr(T=c | X, T=c,s), some unbalance persists between the proportion of 
PPLC in the group of firms for which T=c and the proportion of PPLC in the group of firms for which T=s (Table B in 
the Appendix). Therefore, when estimating the ATTc,s, we also adjust for the residual difference in the legal form. 
11 When the outcome variable is binary, bias correction occurs through a linear probability model. 
12 The premise for the adoption of this strategy is that non-response does not depend on the outcome variable (Little and 
Rubin, 2014). Indeed, we believe that the information collected through the questionnaire is not so sensitive as to push 
companies to not respond. On the other hand, we cannot rule out that the respondents’ selection process is not 
loss to follows-up due to non-response, in the estimation of the ATTcu and the ATTcs we apply the 
nearest neighbour estimator to outcomes weighed by the inverse of the probability of response. In 
so doing, the contribution of each treated respondent is directly proportional to the “rarity” of 
information provided by the same respondent. Each control unit receives the weight of the treated 
firm to which it is matched. 
Specifically, let Ri, be a binary indicator equal to 1 if firm i responds to the survey. The weight for 
each treated respondent is constructed as follows: 
wi, T=c,=1/Pr(Ri= 1 | Xi, Ti=c),   
where Xi contains the covariates that are available for all treated firms, be they respondent or not 
(sector, province, legal form, number of employees prior to the programme).The probability 
contained in the previous equation was estimated using a logit model. 
 
 
6. Results  
We present now our estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated defined in Section 5.  
Let us start by comparing the outcomes achieved under each of the two policies with the outcomes 
the same firms would achieve in the counterfactual no-policy scenario (Table 2, 3rd and 4th 
columns). Then, we move to the direct comparison of the two policies (Table 2, 5th and 6th 
columns). 
The subsidies to collaborative R&D projects were effective in stimulating persistent networking 
behaviour in the firms that received them (henceforth, we call these C-type firms), and in increasing 
their propensity to engage in unsubsidised R&D activities later on, while the subsidies to individual 
R&D projects raised the amount of investment in R&D in the recipient firms (henceforth, we call 
these S-type firms) in the unsubsidised follow-up period. In particular, after the end of the policies, 
the probability to collaborate with external partners of C-type firms is 14% higher than it would 
have been without the collaboration subsidy, and their probability to collaborate with universities is 
21% higher. On the other hand, it seems that the subsidies for collaborative R&D did not 
substantially raise their probability of networking with other firms over time. This is in line with the 
idea, suggested by the literature recalled in the second section, that networking with this latter type 
of partner is not unlikely to occur spontaneously, while networking with universities can be 
facilitated by public support. Besides increasing their willingness to engage in subsequent 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
completely random. Under these circumstances, it makes sense to assume that non-response occurs at random 
conditional on a vector of observable variables, including those used for estimating the propensity score. 
innovation-related interactions with research organisations, participation in the R&D collaboration 
policy induced a change in firms’ behaviour towards R&D activities.  
Indeed, the causal effect of the subsidy to collaborative projects on the probability of performing 
any unsubsidised, internal R&D in the follow-up period is almost 18%, whereas its effect on the 
amount of R&D investment is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the subsidy to 
collaborative R&D may induce former non performers to continue to invest in R&D also beyond 
the time horizon of the subsidised project, but also that such later investments are not necessarily 
high. Such an inducement effect was not found for firms receiving the subsidy to individual R&D 
projects, the vast majority of which already performed some R&D prior to programme 
participation. However, the latter subsidy was able to increase the amount of future R&D 
investment by around 64 thousand euro annually. 
To evaluate which policy is more effective, it would not be correct to compare directly the two 
ATTs commented so far, as the participants in the two policies are partially different. To this end, 
we must go a step further (Table 2, 5th and 6th columns, as explained in Section 4) and perform 
ceteris paribus comparisons between the two. 
The causal effect of the subsidy to collaborative R&D on its recipients was to increase by about 
13% the probability of subsequently performing unsubsidised R&D activities (5th column). 
However, no significant effect is found in the amount of R&D investment or on networking 
behaviour of the C-type firms. On the contrary, if we look at S-type firms, we find that the 
probability of having subsequent relationships either with universities or with other firms decreased 
by about 30% (35% for universities and 37% for other firms). On the other hand, S-type firms 
would not have experienced any significant change in R&D had they participated in the other 
policy. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Summarizing, we cannot univocally confirm neither hypothesis H1 nor hypothesis H2 without 
accounting for the type of firms that receive the two different types of R&D subsidies. This is, in 
our view, the most interesting part of the story, which will be further discussed in the next Section. 
Before advancing any interpretation, in what follows we briefly assess the risk that the previous 
findings are false positives. Indeed, when one performs multiple tests on the same data, some of 
these tests may appear statistically significant purely by chance. To address this issue, we take the 
approach by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) based on false discovery rates (FDR). A FDR is the 
maximum proportion that one is willing to accept of apparently significant results (discoveries) 
being false positives.  
The statistical significance of all our estimated treatment effects is preserved by setting the FDR at 
25%, which entails that, in general, it is unlikely that our discoveries are false positives. In 
particular, when we consider l=s and m=u, a FDR of 25% is required to preserve the statistical 
significance (at 10%) of the positive effects estimated with respect to R&D investment. When we 
consider l=s and m=c, the statistical significance (at 5%) of the positive effects estimated with 
respect to Collaborations and Other firms is preserved,  provided that we accept that only 20%  of 
these two discoveries are false positives, whereas a FDR of 15% is sufficient to preserve statistical 
significance (at 5%) of the positive effect on Universities. In all the other cases, a FDR of 10% is 
sufficient to confirm the statistical significance of our findings. In particular, where l=c and m=u, 
the statistical significance (at 1%) of the positive treatment effects on Universities is already 
guaranteed by a FDR of 5%, whereas significance (at 5%) of positive effects on R&D and 
Collaborations requires the FDR to be set at 10%. Finally, where l=c and m=s, a FDR of 10% is 
enough to preserve the statistical significance (at 5%) of the positive effect discovered with respect 
to R&D. 
 
7. Do we need subsidies to collaborative R&D to stimulate R&D and networking? A brief 
discussion 
In this section, we elaborate on the results of the previous analysis, which suggest that subsidies for 
collaborative R&D and subsidies for individual R&D are used by partially different firms, and 
therefore their success depends on the type of firms they are able to attract. They also suggest that 
things do not always go as expected. 
Our findings show that, in general, policies subsidising collaborative R&D do not necessarily 
perform better than policies subsidising individual R&D. It is true that the former policy stimulates 
the participating firms to embark in R&D activities in an unsubsidised future, and that it does so 
more than the latter policy. However, the participants in the policy subsidising individual R&D 
would not have increased their R&D had they participated in the former. In addition, although the 
beneficiaries of subsidies to individual projects would have increased their networking had they 
taken the collaborative subsidy, the opposite is not true. Indeed, the point is that the participants in 
the two policies are partly different, although not enough to impede any ceteris paribus comparison.  
The policy supporting collaborative R&D attracts firms that are relatively more accustomed to 
networking than to internal R&D effort, and induces them to confirm such collaborative effort, but 
a classical subsidy to individual projects would be sufficient to achieve the same goal. Evidently, 
the innovation model of these firms is based on collaborations with external organisations, and, no 
matter what type of funded project they participate in, they do search for external collaborations. If, 
instead, subsidies to collaborative R&D were given to firms that are relatively more inclined 
towards an in-house innovation model and are not so accustomed to collaborate, then the 
collaboration subsidy would pave the way to future networking more than the subsidy to individual 
projects. 
On the other hand, the subsidy to collaborative R&D stimulates R&D in firms that, prior to policy 
participation, were not accustomed to R&D investment. This suggest that, for many of these firms, 
collaboration can be a gateway to internal R&D, to the extent that they might need to collaborate 
with others in order to understand that own R&D effort is also important in order to get the most 
from collaborations (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Lokshin et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2012). It is 
possible that after having carried out some R&D activities through external collaborations, the firms 
have accumulated some internal knowledge and decide that it is worth to start their own R&D 
activities. It is also possible that some learning by interacting is at work here, so that the firms learn 
how to structure such internal activities from the partners they collaborate with.  
Our results highlight the importance for policymakers to choose the appropriate intervention given 
the characteristics of the targeted SMEs. If the policymakers’ aim was to expand in a non-transitory 
way the number of SMEs that perform R&D – i.e. to induce an improvement in the spontaneous 
extensive margin over time – they could target firms with modest R&D experience through an R&D 
collaboration policy, rather than implement an individual R&D subsidy which would likely attract 
firms that are already performing internal R&D and will continue to do so also when the subsidy is 
no longer there. Obviously, targeting can be difficult to do in practice. However, innovation 
intermediaries (Howells, 2006; Russo et al., 2016) that - in some sectors, technologies or territories 
- map the characteristics of firms and their skills could provide support in this activity.  
Instead, if the policymakers’ aim was to increase the total amount of R&D investment - i.e. to 
induce an improvement in the spontaneous intensive margin over time – they should target SMEs 
that are already R&D performers and are likely to be ready to increase their effort, and either type 
of programme could be fine. This suggests that SMEs that are already R&D performers may benefit 
more from the relief of financing constraints, rather than from the interorganisational learning 
triggered by R&D collaboration. 
Finally, if the policymakers’ aim was to increase networking by SMEs, the implementation of a 
R&D collaboration programme is likely to bring some positive results irrespective of the type of 
beneficiary firms, whereas the subsidy to individual projects is not.  
Clearly, to elaborate highly precise policy design suggestions, it would also be important to 
establish which is the intensity of policy support that stimulates further investment in different types 
of firms, including R&D experienced or unexperienced ones (Peters et al., 2017), or large or small 
firms (Bia and Mattei, 2012). However, this task goes beyond the scope of our analysis.     
The previous results may have some implications in terms of the innovation policy mix (Flanagan et 
al., 2011). Indeed, the recognition of the fact that some interventions have different effects on 
different firms, and that some policies may be more effective than others in stimulating a particular 
effect stresses the importance of maintaining a relatively varied policy mix.  
 
8. Conclusions 
Our study makes an original contribution to the debate on innovation policies and its effectiveness. 
By comparing two different types of R&D policies that used the same instrument (a subsidy), but 
promoted different activities (in-house R&D investments vs collaborative R&D), we found that the 
policy supporting collaborative R&D was able to stimulate a change in firms’ behaviour both 
towards R&D investment and networking, but these different effects were likely to occur in 
different groups of firms. SMEs that, prior to policy participation, were less likely to collaborate 
with external organisations were those that could see, in an unsubsidised future, their propensity to 
networking improved by the participation in a policy supporting collaborative R&D. SMEs that, 
prior to policy participation, were less likely to perform internal R&D activities were those that 
could see, in an unsubsidised future, their propensity to perform some R&D improved by receiving 
a subsidy for collaborative R&D, thus raising the proportion of R&D-performing SMEs in the 
economy. 
Our results come from the analysis of a relatively small regional case study. Therefore, they should 
be corroborated by further empirical research conducted in other locations or regarding similar 
programmes of larger size before the last word is written on the topic. However, we believe that our 
contribution can stimulate further debate on whether, and for whom, subsidies to collaborative 
R&D are preferable to other, and maybe simpler, forms of public support to the innovative activity 
of SMEs. 
Furthermore, while we think that this issue is particularly important for SMEs, we have to highlight 
that our considerations apply to this type of firms only. Therefore, as R&D policies are also relevant 
outside this specific field, it might be interesting to analyse policies in which large firms are 
involved. 
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Table 1. Means of the background and outcome variables for firms that received the subsidy for 
collaborative R&D projects and for firms that received the subsidy for individual R&D projects and 
their untreated controls 
Variable Subsidies for collaborative projects Subsidies for individual projects 
 Treated Controls Treated Controls 
R&D-1 (1/0) 0.580 0.353 0.833 0.430 
R&D investment-1 164.021 77.271 179.823 47.340 
Universities-1 (1/0) 0.362 0.142 0.183 0.076 
Other firms-1 (1/0) 0.391 0.310 0.192 0.107 
     
Sector: food 0.072 0.059 0.017 0.006 
Sector: marble products 0.058 0.090 0.033 0.032 
Sector: textiles, clothing, shoes 0.145 0.130 0.367 0.340 
Sector: chemicals 0.043 0.031 0.033 0.027 
Sector: machinery and equipment 0.145 0.146 0.167 0.221 
Sector: electrical machineries and electronics 0.087 0.071 0.092 0.077 
Sector: automotive 0.058 0.015 0.025 0.027 
Sector: furniture 0.043 0.074 0.058 0.066 
Sector: electricity, gas, water distribution 0.014 0.012 0.008 0.002 
Sector: construction 0.058 0.037 0.017 0.008 
Sector: wholesale and retail trade 0.014 0.056 0.025 0.030 
Sector: ICT 0.087 0.093 0.033 0.057 
Sector: R&D 0.043 0.012 0.008 0.014 
Sector: business services 0.072 0.118 0.033 0.039 
Sector: other sectors 0.058 0.056 0.083 0.054 
     
Employees-1 : up to 9 0.464 0.452 0.158 0.393 
Employees-1 : 10-29 0.319 0.313 0.408 0.387 
Employees-1 : 30-49 0.101 0.167 0.367 0.188 
Employees-1: 50+ 0.116 0.068 0.067 0.032 
     
Public or private limited company (1/0) 0.667 0.328 0.983 0.987 
     
Province: Massa Carrara 0.087 0.053 0.033 0.030 
Province: Lucca 0.043 0.074 0.067 0.079 
Province: Pistoia 0.029 0.043 0.100 0.077 
Province: Florence 0.246 0.257 0.325 0.258 
Province: Livorno 0.087 0.080 0.008 0.022 
Province: Pisa 0.101 0.183 0.117 0.128 
Province: Arezzo 0.029 0.062 0.058 0.114 
Province: Siena 0.130 0.115 0.042 0.082 
Province: Grosseto 0.058 0.034 0.008 0.016 
Province: Prato 0.188 0.099 0.242 0.194 
     
OUTCOMES     
R&D (1/0) 0.652 0.378 0.817 0.448 
R&D investment 161.946 43.757 179.977 53.379 
Collaborations 0.580 0.220 0.358 0.154 
Universities 0.464 0.118 0.242 0.081 
Other firms 0.391 0.186 0.250 0.119 
 
 
   
N. of observations 69 323 120 630 
Note to table: R&D investment figures are expressed at constant prices, with base year 2001, computed using the R&D 
investment deflator provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics. 
 
  
Table 2. Estimates of the ATTlm. Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets  
Outcome variable Treatment vs no treatment Treatment c vs treatment s and 
viceversa 
l=c; m=u  l=s; m=u  l=c; m=s  l=s; m=c  
R&D  0.178 
(0.070)  
[0.011] 
**
 -0.039 
(0.049)  
[0.430] 
 0.138 
(0.056)  
[0.014] 
** -0.038 
(0.123)  
[0.761] 
R&D investment 30.801 
(19.139) 
[0.108] 
63.836 
(32.000) 
[0.046] 
** -28.451 
(22.350) 
[0.203] 
28.986 
(33.242)  
[0.383] 
Collaborations  0.144 
(0.070) 
[0.041] 
** 0.012 
(0.050) 
[0.812] 
  -0.016 
(0.068)  
[0.812] 
 
-0.305 
(0.180) 
[0.090] 
* 
Universities  0.206 
(0.072) 
[0.004] 
*** 0.021 
(0.047) 
[0.657] 
  -0.081 
(0.076)  
[0.282] 
 
-0.350 
(0.176) 
[0.046] 
** 
Other firms  0.053 
(0.063)  
[0.400] 
0.006 
(0.036)  
[0.871] 
 -0.002 
(0.052)  
[0.970] 
-0.373 
(0.173)  
[0.031] 
** 
Note to table: Statistical significance: *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
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APPENDIX 
Table A – Estimated coefficients of the CBPS models 
CBPS model for: esu = Pr(T=s | X, T=s,u) 
  
ecu = Pr(T=c | X, T=c,u) 
  
ecs = Pr(T=c | X, T=c,s) 
  
esc= Pr(T=s| X, T=s,c) 
 
                    
 
Estimate 
 
S.E. p-value 
 
Estimate 
 
S.E. p-value 
 
Estimate 
 
S.E. p-value 
 
Estimate 
 
S.E. p-value 
Intercept -0.823 
 
1.420 0.562 
 
-1.140 
 
2.250 0.612 
 
4.310 ** 2.110 0.041 
 
-4.590 ** 1.870 0.014 
Universities-1 (1/0) 0.489 * 0.268 0.069 
 
1.090 * 0.603 0.071 
 
0.994 *** 0.268 0.000 
 
-0.908 
**
* 0.271 0.001 
Other firms-1 (1/0) 0.008 
 
0.205 0.969 
 
0.162 
 
0.364 0.657 
 
1.570 *** 0.322 0.000 
 
-1.480 
**
* 0.278 0.000 
R&D-1 (1/0) 1.760 *** 0.196 0.000 
 
0.144 
 
0.239 0.546 
 
-2.520 *** 0.371 0.000 
 
2.110 
**
* 0.374 0.000 
R&D investment-1 (cont.) 0.001 
 
0.294 0.997 
 
0.001 
 
0.219 0.997 
 
0.002 
 
0.314 0.994 
 
-0.002 
 
0.286 0.995 
Sector (base: Food) 
                   
Marble -1.920 *** 0.224 0.000 
 
-1.090 *** 0.377 0.004 
 
0.166 
 
0.364 0.649 
 
0.503 
 
0.327 0.124 
Fashion -2.660 *** 0.395 0.000 
 
-0.337 
 
0.408 0.408 
 
-1.050 
 
0.788 0.181 
 
0.924 
 
0.738 0.210 
Chemicals -2.530 *** 0.345 0.000 
 
-0.308 
 
0.308 0.317 
 
0.044 
 
0.418 0.916 
 
0.164 
 
0.426 0.701 
Mechanics -2.560 *** 0.166 0.000 
 
-0.895 ** 0.436 0.040 
 
-0.458 
 
0.737 0.534 
 
0.267 
 
0.690 0.699 
Electrical machinery -2.580 *** 0.254 0.000 
 
-0.570 
 
0.469 0.224 
 
-0.996 
 
0.704 0.157 
 
1.630 ** 0.687 0.018 
Automotive -2.050 *** 0.203 0.000 
 
0.594 ** 0.232 0.010 
 
1.400 *** 0.408 0.001 
 
-1.510 
**
* 0.368 0.000 
Furniture -2.470 *** 0.363 0.000 
 
-0.391 
 
0.278 0.160 
 
1.010 ** 0.414 0.015 
 
-0.965 ** 0.393 0.014 
Energy and utilities -0.488 *** 0.140 0.000 
 
-0.604 ** 0.248 0.015 
 
-1.410 *** 0.261 0.000 
 
1.120 
**
* 0.240 0.000 
Constructions -2.490 *** 0.298 0.000 
 
0.175 
 
0.305 0.566 
 
-1.680 *** 0.444 0.000 
 
1.910 
**
* 0.393 0.000 
Wholesale/retail trade -1.370 *** 0.193 0.000 
 
-1.500 *** 0.306 0.000 
 
-1.650 *** 0.315 0.000 
 
1.850 
**
* 0.264 0.000 
ICT -2.740 *** 0.136 0.000 
 
-0.738 
 
0.474 0.120 
 
-0.035 
 
0.697 0.960 
 
0.216 
 
0.645 0.738 
R&D services -3.150 *** 0.311 0.000 
 
0.967 ** 0.386 0.012 
 
-0.772 ** 0.328 0.019 
 
-0.871 
**
* 0.333 0.009 
Business services -2.270 *** 0.401 0.000 
 
-1.060 ** 0.489 0.031 
 
-2.150 *** 0.408 0.000 
 
2.010 
**
* 0.413 0.000 
Other sectors -1.260 *** 0.211 0.000 
 
-0.548 
 
0.357 0.125 
 
0.305 
 
0.608 0.616 
 
0.092 
 
0.597 0.877 
Employees-1 (base: Up to 9) 
                   
10-29 employees 0.849 *** 0.307 0.006 
 
-0.243 
 
0.209 0.245 
 
-0.757 ** 0.363 0.037 
 
0.819 ** 0.407 0.044 
30-49 employees 1.480 *** 0.291 0.000 
 
-1.330 *** 0.252 0.000 
 
-2.010 *** 0.321 0.000 
 
1.630 
**
* 0.327 0.000 
50+ employees 0.303 
 
0.480 0.528 
 
-0.282 
 
0.300 0.348 
 
-0.285 
 
0.256 0.265 
 
-0.198 
 
0.245 0.418 
PPLC (1/0) -0.296 
 
0.194 0.127 
 
1.360 *** 0.221 0.000 
 
-3.230 *** 0.255 0.000 
 
3.340 
**
* 0.281 0.000 
Province (base: Massa Carrara) 
                   
Lucca -0.674 
 
0.536 0.209 
 
-1.240 *** 0.293 0.000 
 
-0.071 
 
0.330 0.831 
 
-0.560 . 0.330 0.090 
Pistoia 0.018 
 
0.604 0.976 
 
-1.650 *** 0.344 0.000 
 
-2.750 *** 0.291 0.000 
 
3.230 
**
* 0.288 0.000 
Firenze 0.115 
 
0.431 0.790 
 
-0.835 
 
0.508 0.100 
 
0.133 
 
0.462 0.773 
 
0.225 
 
0.401 0.575 
Livorno -0.879 ** 0.405 0.030 
 
-1.060 *** 0.360 0.003 
 
2.770 *** 0.329 0.000 
 
-2.350 
**
* 0.307 0.000 
Pisa -0.471 
 
0.418 0.260 
 
-1.530 *** 0.535 0.004 
 
-0.711 
 
0.451 0.115 
 
0.868 ** 0.436 0.046 
Arezzo -1.160 ** 0.547 0.034 
 
-1.750 *** 0.419 0.000 
 
-2.240 *** 0.293 0.000 
 
2.660 
**
* 0.276 0.000 
Siena -0.896 
 
0.596 0.133 
 
-0.577 
 
0.424 0.173 
 
1.030 *** 0.354 0.004 
 
-0.806 ** 0.338 0.017 
Grosseto -2.020 *** 0.215 0.000 
 
-0.574 
 
0.434 0.186 
 
0.321 
 
0.281 0.254 
 
0.098 
 
0.279 0.727 
Prato 0.121 
 
0.788 0.877 
 
0.483 
 
0.348 0.166 
 
0.321 
 
0.427 0.452 
 
0.354 
 
0.362 0.328 
Note to table: Statistical significance: *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
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Table B – Normalised mean differences in the covariates of alternative treatment groups, 
unconditional and conditional on the estimated CBPS 
 
esu = Pr(T=s | X, T=s,u) 
 
ecu = Pr(T=c | X, T=c,u) 
 
ecs= Pr(T=c | X, T=c,s) 
 
esc= Pr(T=s | X, T=s,c) 
 
Unconditio
nal on esu 
Condition
al on esu 
 
Unconditio
nal on ecu 
Condition
al on ecu 
 
Unconditio
nal on ecs 
Condition
al on ecs 
 
Unconditio
nal on esc 
Condition
al on esc 
            Universities-1 
(1/0) 0.370 0.001 
 
0.570 0.129 
 
0.413 0.070 
 
-0.413 -0.126 
Other firms-1 
(1/0) 0.258 0.012 
 
0.174 0.018 
 
0.451 0.041 
 
-0.451 -0.120 
R&D-1 (1/0) 0.807 0.010 
 
0.464 0.062 
 
-0.577 -0.314 
 
0.577 0.126 
R&D 
investment-1 
(cont.) 0.744 0.086 
 
0.415 0.175 
 
-0.062 -0.120 
 
0.062 -0.174 
Food 0.097 0.022 
 
0.055 -0.005 
 
0.273 0.151 
 
-0.273 0.026 
Marble 0.010 -0.006 
 
-0.114 -0.012 
 
0.122 -0.086 
 
-0.122 0.018 
Fashion 0.057 -0.008 
 
0.044 0.017 
 
-0.490 -0.065 
 
0.490 0.379 
Chemicals 0.039 -0.003 
 
0.070 0.016 
 
0.054 0.133 
 
-0.054 0.073 
Mechanics -0.133 -0.007 
 
-0.002 -0.021 
 
-0.059 -0.193 
 
0.059 -0.410 
Electrical 
machinery 0.053 0.011 
 
0.060 0.000 
 
-0.016 -0.038 
 
0.016 -0.048 
Automotive -0.012 -0.003 
 
0.283 0.151 
 
0.174 -0.005 
 
-0.174 -0.170 
Furniture -0.032 -0.003 
 
-0.122 -0.008 
 
-0.066 0.047 
 
0.066 0.064 
Energy and 
utilities 0.131 0.148 
 
0.019 -0.013 
 
0.060 0.079 
 
-0.060 0.049 
Constructions 0.091 0.013 
 
0.105 -0.015 
 
0.235 0.206 
 
-0.235 0.020 
Wholesale/ret
ail trade -0.030 0.000 
 
-0.192 -0.006 
 
-0.073 -0.079 
 
0.073 -0.061 
ICT -0.105 0.000 
 
-0.020 -0.016 
 
0.239 -0.013 
 
-0.239 -0.082 
R&D services -0.051 0.001 
 
0.234 -0.004 
 
0.244 0.044 
 
-0.244 -0.016 
Business 
services -0.032 -0.003 
 
-0.144 -0.001 
 
0.183 0.121 
 
-0.183 -0.160 
Other sectors 0.126 -0.020 
 
0.010 -0.026 
 
-0.097 -0.011 
 
0.097 0.171 
Up to 9 
employees -0.545 -0.007 
 
0.024 0.020 
 
0.699 0.342 
 
-0.699 -0.170 
10-29 
employees 0.044 0.004 
 
0.013 -0.011 
 
-0.184 -0.230 
 
0.184 0.039 
30-49 
employees 0.434 -0.011 
 
-0.181 -0.031 
 
-0.596 -0.149 
 
0.596 0.133 
50+ 
employees 0.185 0.028 
 
0.180 0.024 
 
0.177 0.051 
 
-0.177 -0.042 
PPLC (1/0) -0.035 -0.005 
 
0.694 0.063 
 
-0.932 -0.828 
 
0.932 0.024 
Massa Carrara 0.019 0.045 
 
0.135 -0.004 
 
0.227 0.095 
 
-0.227 -0.053 
Lucca -0.046 0.000 
 
-0.122 -0.009 
 
-0.099 -0.066 
 
0.099 -0.193 
Pistoia 0.083 -0.004 
 
-0.072 -0.007 
 
-0.270 -0.085 
 
0.270 0.192 
Firenze 0.152 -0.005 
 
-0.024 -0.031 
 
-0.172 -0.068 
 
0.172 -0.087 
Livorno -0.099 -0.001 
 
0.024 0.061 
 
0.415 0.285 
 
-0.415 -0.028 
Pisa -0.034 0.007 
 
-0.217 -0.015 
 
-0.048 -0.261 
 
0.048 0.042 
Arezzo -0.181 -0.004 
 
-0.143 0.005 
 
-0.137 -0.116 
 
0.137 -0.225 
Siena -0.153 -0.002 
 
0.049 -0.005 
 
0.338 0.232 
 
-0.338 -0.008 
Grosseto -0.062 -0.003 
 
0.125 -0.012 
 
0.308 0.280 
 
-0.308 0.018 
Prato 0.118 -0.011 
 
0.280 0.031 
 
-0.128 -0.022 
 
0.128 0.203 
	  
 
 
 
